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We know that one of the horrors of Nazi Germany was children
snitching on their parents. It seems to me common decency that
you don't put a child before a grand jury on her mother's
conduct.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Defense Function Committee of the American Bar
Association-Criminal Justice Section decided that it would draft a
model parent-child privilege statute. This decision was based in
part on the committee's concern over prosecutors calling children
to testify against their parents before grand juries and at trials.
The committee was further concerned that prosecutors were not
addressing the issue of the future welfare of child witnesses. The
committee took the position that an ABA-sanctioned model stat-
ute was needed to provide guidance to courts and legislatures faced
with the privilege issue.
The committee prepared the first draft of the statute in 19832
and presented it to the Criminal Justice Section Council for com-
1. Burke, Nevada Girl, 16, Ordered to Testify Against Mother, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 9, 1981,
at 3, col. 2 (quoting Irving Younger).
2. The statute was only a page and a half in length, addressing only a confidential com-
munication privilege.
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ment in the spring of 1984. In a concise brief the prosecutors took
issue with and rejected the whole notion of a new privilege. The
Defense Function Committee then decided to reevaluate its ap-
proach to the situation. In the fall of 1984, the incoming chairman
of the Defense Function Committee reassigned the responsibility
for the drafting of the statute to a new subcommittee.4
The research for the project began in January 1985. The sub-
committee drafted a statute and presented it with a supporting
document in April 1985 to a joint meeting of the Defense and
Prosecution Function Committees. The prosecutors, although gen-
erally opposed to the idea of a new privilege, were willing to dis-
cuss the issue because it involved children. However, when the
privilege was presented to a meeting of the entire Prosecution
Function Committee in San Francisco a month later, the commit-
tee was not at all receptive. The committee took a hard, uncompro-
mising stand against the privilege.' At this point, the battle began.
Since the May 1985 meeting, the privilege has been presented to
the prosecutors for information or discussion on three separate oc-
casions. Again, the prosecutors were uncompromising and en-
couraged the Defense Function Committee to drop the whole pro-
ject. The proposed privilege, then in its fourteenth draft, was
presented for action to the Criminal Justice Section Council on
August 9, 1986. Although lengthy debate preceded the vote, the
Council adopted the statute.'
Before the statute was presented to the American Bar Associa-
tion House of Delegates for action in February 1987, as originally
scheduled, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws argued that the ABA should not take action on the
3. The Prosecution Function Committee filed a response brief to the proposed statute. In
essence, the brief stated that such a statute was unnecessary. The committee argued further
that no legal basis for the creation of such a statute existed.
4. Defense Function Committee Chairman E.E. "Bo" Edwards appointed the author as
chairperson of the subcommittee responsible for drafting the parent-child privilege statute.
Research assistants for the original report were Mercer law students Mark Gager, Chris
Shuman, and Don Clark. Alice Waller, Jim Williams, and Dee Hill, also of Mercer Law
School, participated as research assistants in 1986.
5. Four members of the Prosecution Function Committee not only opposed the privilege
but made clear in voicing their opinions that the issue would continue to be highly contro-
versial and emotional.
6. The Criminal Justice Section Council vote was 12-7.
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statute because it involved a matter that impacted on state laws of
evidence. The N.C.C.U.S.L. requested that they be given time to
study the statute. The Criminal Justice Section agreed to withdraw
the statute from the House of Delegate's action calendar until the
August 1987 annual ABA meeting to afford the N.C.C.U.S.L. the
time they requested.
When the actual drafting process began in February 1985, the
politics of the voting audience had to be taken into account. The
first draft was actually a family privilege and was intended to be
very broad; the draft left ample room to accommodate all the pros-
ecutors' remarks about how the statute should be changed. As the
next thirteen versions were redrafted and fine tuned, the statute
became more and more narrow. This fact has been a source of disa-
greement among the members of the Defense Function Commit-
tee.7 However, in the interest of a favorable outcome in the August
1987 voting, the final version of the statute contained in this Arti-
cle was presented to the Criminal Justice Section Council in its
narrow form.
This Article is the supporting document for the parent-child
privilege project. This Article is not intended to be an in-depth
treatise on privilege law, but is intended solely to document and
support an innovative approach to the need for the adoption of a
parent-child privilege. The Article concludes with the proposed
model statute and official comment designed to accomplish that
goal.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES IN AMERICAN LAW
The privilege has long been one of the most controversial sub-
jects within the body of American evidence law. Unlike other evi-
dentiary rules aimed at ascertaining the truth by excluding unreli-
able evidence,8 privileges preclude compelled testimony from
individuals who are participants in protected relationships. Be-
7. Several members of the Defense Function Committee continue to feel strongly that the
statute should be written as a broad family privilege. The author believes that such a stat-
ute would never have been seriously entertained by the Criminal Justice Section Council.
8. Examples include the exclusionary rules, including the hearsay rule, the opinion rule,
the best evidence rule, and the rule rejecting proof of bad character as evidence of crime.
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cause privileges can impede both the fact finding process and the
search for truth, they are often viewed as being contrary to the
centuries-old common law principle that "the public has a right to
every man's evidence."9 Society, however, although aware of the
potential disadvantages associated with privileges, recognizes the
occasional protection of privileged relationships as more valuable
than the goal of seeking the ultimate truth.
The concept of privilege law dates back to ancient Rome.10 Evi-
dentiary privileges were first recognized at common law during the
Elizabethan period.1 The first specific evidentiary privilege pro-
tected the attorney-client relationship, with cases addressing the
attorney-client privilege dating back to 1577.12 Not long after, the
common law recognized a spousal privilege.13 This broad privilege
protected communications between spouses. It was premised on
the beliefs that husband and wife were a single entity before the
law and that one could not be forced to testify for or against her or
himself. 4 By the middle of the seventeenth century the spousal
privilege was established in both civil and criminal law. 5 Courts
developed exceptions to the attorney-client and spousal privileges
through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 6 but by the
early years of the nineteenth century common law evidentiary
privileges were firmly established in English law.'"
The development of evidentiary privileges in American law was
rather slow. Prior to the early nineteenth century, American judges
faced with privilege issues had no choice but to be guided by the
9. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 674 (1972) (quoting In re Pappas, 358 Mass.
604, 607, 266 N.E.2d 297, 299 (1971)); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT Com-
MON LAW § 2192, at 70 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
10. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Cli-
ent, 16 CALIF. L. REy. 487, 488 (1928).
11. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 8, at 607 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983).
12. See Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1577); Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53
(1580).
13. See Bent v. Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1580).
14. Project, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 208, 208 (1961); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence:
Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 675 (1929).
15. See W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 126-222 (7th ed. 1956).
16. See, e.g., H. BATHURST, THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE (London 1761).
17. See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 8a, at 607.
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English common law. Congress and state legislatures left alone the
issues of privilege law well into the nineteenth century. Faced at
that time with the codification movement and enthusiastic scholars
forcing it along,'8 state legislatures began the attempt to codify ev-
idence codes. The codification movement prompted state legisla-
tures to adopt privilege statutes to replace the common law privi-
leges. New privileges were a subject of legislative action as early as
1828 when New York adopted a physician-patient privilege stat-
ute."9 Missouri adopted a very similar privilege statute seven years
later.20
The states continued to replace the common law of evidence
with new statutes. By 1860 a great disparity existed among the
states' laws of evidence. By the late nineteenth century, American
lawyers, legal scholars, and jurists began to express concern about
these disparities. James Bradley Thayer, in his treatise on evi-
dence, stated that existing state evidence laws were a patchwork
"of confused doctrines, expressed in ambiguous phrases, Latin or
English, half understood, but glibly used . . .
Continuing concern about the confusion within the law of evi-
dence prompted a group of legal scholars to form the Committee to
Propose Specific Reforms in the Law of Evidence.2' Formed in
1922, the group worked for five years before suggesting various
needed changes in the law of evidence. 23 The group stated that its
ultimate goal was unification. 4
In 1942, the American Law Institute published the Model Code
of Evidence. 2'5 The model code, however, failed to gain wide sup-
port. In 1949, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws also began drafting rules of evidence; the Uniform
18. See D. FIELD, CENTENARY ESSAYS (A. Peppy ed. 1949).
19. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2380, at 819-20.
20. See id., §2380, at 820.
21. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 512 (1898).
22. See E. MORGAN, Z. CHAFEE, R. GIFFORD, E. HINTON, C. HOUGH, W. JOHNSTON, E. SUN-
DERLAND, & J. WIGMORE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM (1927).
23. Id. at xix-xx.
24. Id.
25. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942). Despite their general aversion to privileges, see id.
at 2231, the authors included the attorney-client (Rule 26), spousal (Rule 28), priest-peni-
tent (Rule 29), physician-patient (Rule 27), and government informant (Rule 36) privileges.
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Rules of Evidence were completed and approved in 1953.26 The
Uniform Rules explicitly recognized the attorney-client, physician-
patient, clergy-communicant, and informer identity privileges.27
Despite initial enthusiasm for the Uniform Rules, however, only
two states adopted the rules in the next fifteen years.2 8
In 1974, the National Conference revised its rules. Since then,
many states have adopted at least major portions of the docu-
ment. 9 The National Conference again is revising its rules, includ-
ing the lawyer-client, physician- and psychotherapist-patient, hus-
band-wife, and religious privileges.3 0
Until the 1975 enactment by Congress of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, much confusion surrounded the issue of the application
of privilege law in federal courts. Courts were split over civil mat-
ters, with some courts thinking state statutes applied and others
taking the position that state court decisions controlled. 1 Criminal
cases posed less of a problem after the Supreme Court held in 1934
that in criminal cases the federal courts were free to apply "com-
mon law principles as interpreted. . . in light of reason and expe-
rience. '' 32 This holding, codified as Rule 26 in the 1946 Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,3 explicitly included a reference to
witnesses' privileges.
After years of confusion surrounding issues of evidence law, the
American Bar Association urged the Judicial Conference of the
United States to create and adopt rules of evidence for the federal
district courts.3 4 In 1973, the Supreme Court transmitted the pro-
26. UNIF. R. EVID. 23-39 (ed. 1974).
27. Id.
28. Kansas and New Jersey were the only two states to adopt the first Uniform Rules of
Evidence.
29. See generally 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 501(07), 502(05),
503(03), 504(08), 506(06), 507(05), 508(05), 509(12), 510(08), 511(03), 512(03), 513(03)
(1986).
30. See UNIF. R. EVID. (Unpublished Draft 1986).
31. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, RULES OF EVIDENCE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASI-
BILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, reprinted
in 30 F.R.D. 73, 82-89 (1962) [hereinafter FEASIBILITY STUDY].
32. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371 (1933)).
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.
34. See FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 38, 30 F.R.D. at 113.
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posed Federal Rules of Evidence to Congress. 5 The rules included
nine specific privileges. 36 After much discussion, debate, and input
from affected persons, the nine privileges were replaced with Rule
501, which gave the federal courts power to expand privilege law
on a case-by-case basis based on the principles of common law.
37
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES
"Privilege" is derived from the Latin phrase, "privata lex.' '3 8 It
has been defined as a private law applicable to a small group of
persons as their special prerogative,39 or as a particular and pecu-
liar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company, or class
beyond the common advantages of others. 40 Although privata lex
was a term developed in the days of ancient Rome, privileges pro-
tecting special relationships existed centuries before Rome coined
a term for them.
The rule of privilege must be distinguished from the rule of ex-
clusion. While both serve to block the introduction of probative
facts,41 the rationale for each is quite different. Rules of exclusion
include the hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the rule rejecting proof
of bad character as evidence of crime, and the best evidence rule.42
All were designed to preclude the introduction of unreliable or un-
trustworthy information which could cloud the fact finding pro-
cess.43 The rules of privilege have an equally noble purpose. Al-
though privileges may impair and in rare circumstances even
completely stifle the fact finding process, 44 they guard and foster
relationships that society deems desirable and worthy of protec-
35. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7052.
36. Id. at __, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 7058. Included were the attor-
ney-client, psychotherapist-patient, clergy-communicant, and husband-wife adverse testimo-
nial privileges. Neither the physician-patient nor the husband-wife confidential communica-
tions privileges were included.
37. FED. R. EVID. 501.
38. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1805 (1986).
39. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV.
175, 181 (1960).
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979).
41. See C. McCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 72, at 171 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
42. Id. at 170-71.
43. Id. at 171.
44. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2192, at 72-73.
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tion. One noted commentator has stated that "[t]heir warrant is
the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or
wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social important to justify
some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the adminis-
tration of justice. 45
The rules of privilege fall into three categories."8 The first in-
cludes privileges designed to protect the rights of the individual,
such as the exclusionary 'rule or the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.47 The second includes "privileges designed to protect the
integrity of the system of government, '4s such as the privilege that
accompanies government secrets. The third includes privileges
designed to protect individuals as participants in relationships
which the state deems worthy of special protection and
nurturing. 49
Many of our common law principles and many of the legal forms
and customs which we find difficult to explain have their origins in
the Written and Oral Law of Judaism.50 Jewish law is founded
upon two major sources: the legal elements contained in the Five
Books of Moses, also known as the Pentateuch, or in Hebrew, the
Torah; and the development of the Law known as the Tradition.
The Tradition was the Judaic "common law" and served as an au-
thoritative interpretation of the Five Books of Moses.
Jewish law was further developed by scholars and courts, who
based their opinions and decisions on the laws contained in the
Five Books of Moses. They were compiled in the Talmud, which is
considered the basic source of Jewish Law.5 1 The Talmud was
completed in 557 A.D.52 It contains all the opinions, discussions,
and Biblical interpretations of Jewish scholars and courts from the
45. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 72, at 171.
46. Coburn, Child-Parent Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74
DICK. L. REV. 599, 602-03 (1970).
47. Id.
48. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communica-
tions, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1964).
49. Coburn, supra note 46, at 602-03.
50. Auerbach, The Talmud-A Gateway to the Common Law, 3 W. REs. L. REv. 5, 8
(1951).
51. Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish
Law, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 115, 117 n.14 (1956).
52. Id.
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Biblical era until the fifth century A.D.13 One rule of ancient Jew-
ish Law specifically "forbids a parent from testifying against his or
her children. '54
Like the Jews before them, the Romans understood that the
foundation of society was built upon the family. The idea that the
state could reach intra-familial communications to ensure effective
law enforcement was never accepted by Roman law.5 5 Early Roman
law recognized the rule of testimonium domesticum, which man-
dated that parents, children, patrons, freedmen, and slaves could
not be compelled to give testimony against each other.56 The Ro-
mans had several justifications for the exclusions. First, the Ro-
mans believed that every citizen had a duty not to violate the fides
or faith on which the family rested. Second, the Romans believed
that the testimony of family members was valueless either for or
against a litigant; if members of a family testified, they could not
be believed because of the strong motive for misstatement or per-
jury.57 Further, if witnesses violated group solidarity by testifying
against a family member, they were disreputable persons, unwor-
thy of belief.58 The rule also helped to prevent erosion of family
relationships. 5
Perhaps the most famous application of the Roman parent-child
privilege, or testimonium domesticum, was in a case tried by the
great orator Cicero. Cicero was prosecuting the Roman governor of
Sicily on charges of bribery. 0 Under the rule of testimonium
domesticum, Cicero was prevented from calling the governor's pa-
tronus1 as a witness, a move which would have been favorable to
53. Id.
54. In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 579, 581 n.6 (D. Conn. 1982)
(Rabbi Hirsch Joseph Simckes, a graduate of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America,
Rabbi Seymour Siegel, a professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and
Rabbi David Novak, a distinguished author of texts on Jewish law and theology, agreeing
that the privilege is a rule of the Jewish religion, citing Sanhedrin 27B of the Babylonia
Talmud).
55. See generally Radin, supra note 10.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 488.
58. Id. at 488-89 (citing Licinius Rufus 22, 5, 6, at n.9).
59. Id. at 488.
60. Id.
61. A patronus was a father or a person corresponding in some respects to a father. WEB-
STER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1315 (3d ed. 1986).
[Vol. 28:583
PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE
his case. Cicero regretted not being able to call the patronus but
understood and advocated the potential social policy considera-
tions for the exclusions of the testimony.2
Roman law was finally codified during the reign of Emperor Jus-
tinian the Great, who ruled from 527-565 A.D. The resulting codifi-
cation of Roman law was Corpus Juris Civilis. It became the basis
for the laws of the emerging nation-states of Europe during the
Renaissance period.
The Code Napoleon, completed at the order of Napoleon Bona-
parte, was largely founded on Roman law. It included the Roman
rule of law that "no one may be required to disclose confidences
between himself and a family member."63 The Code Napoleon
spread across Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, for with Napo-
leon's legions came Napoleon's law. Although Napoleon's armies
were driven back to France, the Code Napoleon remained a domi-
nant legal influence in continental Europe.
Article 248 of the French Civil Code states, "[n]o one can be
summoned as a witness if he is a blood relation, or a relative by
marriage in direct line, or husband and wife of one of the parties,
even although divorced. '64 The relations included under Article
248 are: father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, son, daughter,
grandson, granddaughter, brothers, sisters, brothers- and sisters-
in-law, and the husband or wife of the accused, even if divorced.
The law of West Germany has a similar provision that prevents
what the Germans call unbefugt, or unauthorized disclosure. 5
Swedish law also embodies a parent-child privilege.6 Additionally,
the prevailing view in the civil law countries of Western Europe is
that no person will be forced to divulge confidences between him
or herself and another family member.
This historical overview of the concept of the parent-child privi-
lege suggests that it is hardly a new or revolutionary one. The idea
has existed for approximately 3,500 years. It is interesting to note
that parent-child privileges, and the testimonial privileges in gen-
62. Radin, supra note 10, at 488.
63. Quick, Self-Incrimination Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 3 WAYNE L. REV. 1
(1950).
64. C. PR. civ. art. 248, § 336 (G. Koch trans. 1963).
65. See ZPO § 52(3) (H. Niebler trans. 1965).
66. SWED. CODE JUD. P. ch. 36, § 3 (A. Bruzelius & R. Ginsburg trans. 1967).
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eral, are conspicuously absent in totalitarian regimes. Nazi Ger-
many had no such privileges. Today, the Soviet Union has no par-
ent-child or family type privilege." Perhaps in totalitarian regimes
not even family relationships are deemed private and free from the
state's intense scrutiny. Without adoption of a parent-child privi-
lege in the United States, we face a similar intrusion into the pri-
vacy of the family. In this time of unstable family relationships, it
is important that we prevent any further harm to the individual's
integrity and the family's autonomy.
IV. EXISTING PRIVILEGES IN AMERICAN LAW
It is generally agreed that certain relationships are vital to soci-
ety. It is also agreed that these relationships cannot exist in ab-
sence of confidentiality. In the United States, five privileges cur-
rently are designed to protect such relationships. Firmly
established in American law, they are: the attorney-client privilege,
the physician-patient privilege, the priest-penitent privilege, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and the husband-wife privilege."
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege originated in the law of ancient
Rome and, oddly enough, was an outgrowth of the Roman family
privilege. 9 The attorney-client privilege also was present in com-
mon law and was established firmly by the reign of Elizabeth I."°
The common law basis for this privilege was the "point of honor"
involved in the gentleman attorney's holding of the secrets of his
client.7 1 The "point of honor" was the basis for the privilege until
the nineteenth century, when the focus turned to the preservation
of the client's right to communicate in confidence with his attor-
ney.72 This new rationale was designed to remove the client's ap-
prehension of compelled disclosure of his attorney-client confi-
67. V. GsovsKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 118-19 (1948) (noting that Soviet law provides no privi-
lege to refuse to testify against close relatives).
68. See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 46, at 601-12.
69. Radin, supra note 10, at 488.
70. 8 J. WICMORE, supra note 9, § 2290, at 542.
71. Id., § 2286, at 530-31.
72. Id., § 2290, at 543.
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dences7 3 An 1846 case gives perhaps the most concise yet complete
rationale for the privilege:
Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may
be pursued too keenly-may cost too much. And, surely the
meanness and the mischief of prying into a man's confidential
consultations with his legal advisor, the general evil of infusing
reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion and fear,
into those communications which must take place and which,
unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place use-
lessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for the truth itself.7 4
The sixth amendment's requirement of the right to counsel in
criminal cases and the fourteenth amendment's due process re-
quirement provide further bases for the attorney-client privilege.
In Caldwell v. United States, 5 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
interception of attorney-client conferences violated those constitu-
tional guarantees.1 6 If the client's conversations with his attorney
were subject to disclosure, the client could be discouraged from re-
vealing essential information to his attorney.1 7 Without a privilege
to shield these confidences, a system of justice based upon fairness
and democratic principles could not exist.
B. Physician-Patient Privilege
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient privi-
lege did not develop at common law, but was created statutorily.
In 1828, New York became the first state to enact a physician-pa-
tient privilege.7 8 Missouri followed New York's lead in 1835 .7 To-
day, more than two-thirds of the states recognize the privilege by
statute.8
73. Id.
74. Pearse v. Pearse, 1 De G. & Sm. 3809, 16 L.J. Ch. 153 (1846).
75. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
76. Id. at 881.
77. Comment, From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy
Mandate a Parent-Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1002, 1006.
78. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2380, at 819.
79. Id. §2380, at 820.
80. See Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psy-
chotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.L. REV. 893, 907-11 (1982).
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The privilege is based upon a legal and an ethical "duty" not to
reveal confidences.81 The important policy consideration support-
ing the privilege is that if patients fear their confidential communi-
cations with the physician might later be revealed, they will be
hesitant to disclose all the facts necessary to treat their illness.8 2
Furthermore, the privilege has the immediate effect of shielding
the patient from embarrassment and invasion of his privacy."s
C. Priest-Penitent Privilege
The priest-penitent privilege did not exist at common law,8 4 but
it has been sanctioned by the legislatures of most states.8 5 The
clergyman is a spiritual and personal counselor, and the relation-
ship arising from that role therefore is one founded upon an atmo-
sphere of confidence and moral trust. Perhaps the most reasonable
justification for the privilege is that compelling clergymen to di-
vulge the substance of communications is so repugnant that it has
been forbidden. 6
D. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Next to the attorney-client privilege, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is the most widely accepted professional privilege in
America. 7 This privilege is based on the premises that confidenti-
ality is necessary for effective treatment of emotional disorders and
that "every person needs the opportunity for intimate and trusting
relationships in which highly personal information can be freely
communicated."8 8 One commentator has stated, "Among physi-
cians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidential-
81. Coburn, supra note 46, at 607.
82. C. McCORMICK, supra note 41, § 98, at 244.
83. Cf. Falkinburg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 831, -, 273 N.W. 478, 480-81 (1937)
(analyzing physician-patient privilege in context of insurance company's request to prove
insured's mental state).
84. See 8 J. WIGNMORE, supra note 9, § 2394, at 869; Regan & Macartney, Professional
Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATH. LAW. 3, 4 (1956).
85. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2395, at 873.
86. Coburn, supra note 46, at 609-10.
87. Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 779
(1979).
88. Stanton, Child-Parent Privilege for Confidential Communications: An Examination
and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 (1982).
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ity. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon
their willingness and ability to talk freely. . . .A threat to secrecy
blocks successful treatment.""e
E. Husband- Wife Privilege
Marital privileges have existed since ancient times. They were
present in Jewish and Roman law, as well as at common law. The
common law rationale for these privileges was that interested par-
ties were not credible witnesses in their own causes.90 This theory
stems from Coke's metaphysical conception of the husband and
wife as one legal entity.91
Parliament abolished the disqualification of husbands and wives
in the English Act of 185392 and replaced it with a rule that sought
to prevent compelled disclosure of communications made between
husband and wife during marriage.9e The basis for the new rule
was that protection of confidential communications between
spouses promotes trust and reliance between the two. Some critics
argue that few couples are aware of this privilege and that there-
fore it does not influence their conduct.9 4 Professor Stanton re-
sponded to this argument by noting that "[t]he fact that most
couples may be unaware of the privilege does not contradict their
expectation of complete confidentiality and presumed abhorrence
of compulsory disclosure of marital secrets. 9e5 In a unique unani-
mous decision in Trammel v. United States,9 the United States
Supreme Court modified its decision in Hawkins v. United
States97 to allow the witness-spouse alone a privilege to refuse to
89. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, reprinted in COMM. ON
RULES OF PRAC. AND PROC., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES
(March 1969).
90. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443. As Blackstone observed, "[I]f they were
admitted to be witnesses for each other, they would contradict one maxim of law, Nemo in
propia causa testis esse debet. . . ." Id. This maxim is translated as: "No one ought to be
a witness in his own cause." See Coburn, supra note 46, at 610 n.73.
91. See Coburn, supra note 46, at 610 n.74.
92. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 78, at 189.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 14, at 682.
95. Stanton, supra note 88, at 6 (footnote omitted).
96. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
97. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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testify adversely.98 The Court reasoned that the justification for
the privilege against adverse spousal testimony lies in the privi-
lege's perceived role in fostering harmony and sanctity of the mar-
riage relationship.9 If the witness-spouse voluntarily testified
against the other about adverse acts, however, the harmony of the
relationship was probably destroyed, and no privilege should block
the testimony.100
V. LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES
The ancient Romans and Jews recognized that the progress of
civilization depended upon the protection of society.10 The most
efficient and desirable means to protect society was to protect the
sanctity of the family and to foster strong family relationships.10 2
This remains true, for the husband-wife and parent-child relation-
ships have the most enduring bonds and are not conditioned solely
upon economic relationships. Although special professional rela-
tionships, such' as the attorney-client or priest-penitent relation-
ships, are also vital to the existence of society, the family unit ex-
isted eons before any form of professional relationship.' 0 3
Rules of privilege are established firmly in American law to
guard relationships which society deems desirable and worthy of
protection. Although such rules protect the priest-penitent, psy-
chotherapist-patient, attorney-client, and husband-wife relation-
ships, the majority of American jurisdictions do not afford similar
protection to the parent-child relationship.
The courts have wrestled with this issue for at least ten years
with tremendous disparity in opinion.10 4 The erratic and inconsis-
98. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 52. A husband-wife confidential communications privilege embraces similar
policy considerations. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951).
101. See E. KESSLER, ANTHROPOLOGY, THE HUMANIZING PROCESS 34 (1974).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 553
(1985); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816
(11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel.
Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Starr, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. Unit A
May 1981); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980);
Port v. Heard, 594 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
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tent pattern of the court decisions makes it appropriate for the
courts and state legislatures to consider seriously the adoption of
the parent-child privileges."°5
The parent-child privileges can be adopted in all jurisdictions.
The federal courts, under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, can adopt
the parent-child privileges on a case-by-case basis. 06 The Federal
District Courts of Nevada'0 7 and Connecticut 0 8 have taken this
approach. The states are free to adopt the parent-child privileges
by statute. A number of state courts faced with the responsibility
of deciding the parent-child privilege issue have suggested and
urged this approach. 09 In addition, statutory modification is the
only avenue afforded some states which prohibit common law ex-
pansion of existing privilege law. 10
Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
579 (D. Conn. 1982); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976); Hunter
v. State, 172 Ind. App. 397, 360 N.E.2d 588 (1977); Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind.
App. 1981); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth,
390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); State v. Bruce,
655 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1983); In re Mark G., 65 A.D.2d 917, 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct.
1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct.
1979); In re Ryan, 123 Misc. 2d 854, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Fain. Ct. 1984); In re Gloria L., 124
Misc. 2d 50, 475 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
105. This Article proposes a model parent-child privileges statute. The statute embodies
two privileges: the parent-child privilege as to adverse testimony, and the parent-child privi-
lege as to confidential communications. In order to understand clearly the issues raised in
this Article, one must delineate the difference between these two privileges.
Three separate privileges are part of the statute. They are: (1) the privilege held by the
witness which allows the witness to decide whether or not to testify adversely; (2) the privi-
lege held by the witness which prevents the witness from being compelled to testify as to a
confidential communication; and (3) the privilege held by the defendant which allows the
defendant to foreclose the disclosure of a confidential communication.
106. See FED. R. EVID. 501. The rule allows the federal courts to adopt new privileges on a
case-by-case basis "in light of reason and experience." Id.
107. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983).
108. In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 579, 584-85 (D. Conn. 1982).
109. See People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 457 N.E.2d 1241 (1983); State v. Gilroy, 313
N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d
1203 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App.
1983); In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
110. At least 11 states have precluded statutorily the judicial expansion of their existing
privilege law: Arkansas, ARK. R. EviD. 501 (1947), California, CAL. EvID. CODE § 911 (1967),
Florida, FLA. STAT. § 90.501 (1976), Maine, ME. R. EvID. 501 (1976), Montana, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-10-501 (1985), Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-501 (1985), Nevada, NEv. REV.
STAT. § 49.015 (1986), New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11.501 (1978), North Dakota, N.D.R.
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Continuity and predictability are necessary in law, but neither
exist in the issue of parent-child privileges. The states are in a bet-
ter position to create some measure of continuity and predictabil-
ity by adopting the parent-child privileges by statute. The federal
courts do not share this advantage, however, because they must
adopt privileges on a case-by-case basis. The leeway in this process
allows continued erratic and inconsistent decisions among the dif-
ferent federal courts. This situation can be remedied in only two
ways. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 must be replaced with
specific privileges, including the parent-child privileges. Second,
the United States Supreme Court must sanction the parent-child
privileges in a decision, giving the federal courts the green light to
proceed in the same direction.
In addition, state codification of the parent-child privileges is
desirable because it would promote legislative uniformity and con-
trol. Codification would preclude useless litigation concerning the
application of the privileges. When a parent-child privilege has
been asserted in the recent past, the hearings and arguments con-
sumed anywhere from two hours to a day and a half.111 Statutory
codification of the privileges would allow judges and lawyers to de-
termine in advance whether or not the privileges would apply in a
certain situation, thus allowing for more efficient proceedings.
A. Constitutional Arguments in Support of Parent-Child
Privileges
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
a number of fundamental rights involving the family. Some argue
that these rights stem directly and explicitly from the Constitu-
tion,'12 while others argue that they fall within the constitutionally
protected penumbral rights. 113 Whatever the source, the Court con-
EvID. 501 (1977), Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2501 (West 1980), and Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.01 (West 1975).
111. Telephone interviews with nine attorneys from different U.S. cities (February 1985
to May 1986).
112. Cf. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 419 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Comment, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting
the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901, 905 (1983).
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sistently has been hesitant to intervene in family affairs, 114 recog-
nizing that familial autonomy and privacy are at the very heart of
the existence of a democratic society. Several cases establish the
constitutional rights of family autonomy and the right of privacy.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"5 for example, in which a public school
teacher taught German in violation of a state statute that prohib-
ited teaching young people foreign languages,116 the Court held
that parents have a right to direct the education of their chil-
dren. 1 7 Justice McReynolds, reasoning that the "liberty" guaran-
teed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment en-
compasses personal rights, stated that "liberty"
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God accord-
ing to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'18
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"9 an Oregon statute required par-
ents, guardians, or any other persons who controlled children be-
tween the ages of eight and sixteen to send those children to the
local public schools. 20 The Court, however, held that parents have
a constitutionally protected right to decide which school their chil-
dren should attend.' 21 Applying the reasoning in Meyer, the Court
held that the statute in question interfered with the "liberty" of
114. See Comment, supra note 77, at 1022.
115. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
116. Id. at 396-97.
117. Id. at 399.
118. Id. Justice McReynolds continued to note that the Constitution rejects Plato's idea
that the state could intervene in the autonomy of the family:
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great ge-
nius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and state were
wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will
be affirmed that any Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the peo-
ple of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
Id. at 402.
119. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
120. Id. at 511.
121. Id. at 534-35.
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parents to direct and control the rearing and education of their
children.122 The Court further stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.1 23
In Griswold v. Connecticut,'4 the Court established the ancient
right of familial privacy in American law.'25 The Court recognized
that securing specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights required it to
recognize the penumbras of those rights.'26 Under the newly recog-
nized fundamental right to privacy, the Court stuck down a Con-
necticut statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by mar-
ried couples.127 Justice Douglas, summarizing the Court's holding,
stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as no-
ble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. "
Today, this landmark decision remains the foundation of the right
to privacy within the family setting.129
122. Id.
123. Id. at 535; see also People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (West-
chester County Ct. 1979). In Fitzgerald, the court stated that "it is clear that our courts
recognize that parents have not only the right but the obligation to provide moral supervi-
sion and guidance for their children." Id. at 715, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
124. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. Id. at 485-86.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 485.
128. Id. at 486.
129. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis may have introduced the concept of a right of
privacy in an 1890 law review article. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). From this beginning, Griswold and its progeny have developed the
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The Court continued to strengthen its judicial recognition of fa-
milial autonomy in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 3 ° In that case, the Court
again held that parents have the right to assume the primary role
in decisions concerning the rearing of their children, and upheld
the right of Amish parents to refuse to send their children to state
schools beyond the eighth grade.131 The Court reasoned, "The his-
tory and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children
is now well established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.' 1 32
The Court's present view of familial autonomy is stated best in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland."33 In Moore, the Court struck
down a local zoning ordinance that prohibited an extended family
from living together in the same house.3 The Court stressed that
the fourteenth amendment long has protected individual liberties
regarding marriage and family life.3 " The Court pointed out that a
number of cases consistently have acknowledged a "private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter."'3 6 The Court agreed
with the rationale applied in Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, and Yoder,
and held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
sheltered familial autonomy. 137 Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, stated, "Our decisions establish that the Constitution pro-
tects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of
our most cherished values, moral and cultural.' ' 38
right to privacy into a strong fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
130. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
131. Id. at 232.
132. Id.
133. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
134. Id. at 506.
135. Id. at 499.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 500-01.
138. Id. at 503-04.
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The Court long has recognized that fundamental familial rights
are essential to the preservation of a democratic society. 139 Careful
consideration of these familial rights in the context of the parent-
child relationship shows clearly that the Constitution provides a
firm basis for the establishment of the parent-child privileges. "
As one commentator has stated, "Since parent-child communica-
tions are at the very heart of family life and relationships, they can
properly be classed as fundamental along with those familial rights
that the autonomy strand of the right of privacy is designed to
protect."''
In order for parents to exercise their rights to raise their chil-
dren and instill in them morals and values, society must encourage
a mutual trust between parent and child. If the state is allowed, as
it presently is, to intrude upon the parent-child relationship by
compelling parents and children to testify adversely about one an-
other, the mutual trust will be replaced by suspicion and dishar-
mony. 142 The potential harm to the family unit is obvious. As a
New York court asked: "Shall it be said . . . 'listen to your son at
the risk of being compelled to testify about his confidences?' "13
The court stressed the negative implications of compelling testi-
mony by parents and children against each other by stating:
Having established that the integrity of family relational in-
terests is clearly entitled to constitutional protection, we turn to
an examination of the nature of the interest asserted in the case
before us. The role of the family, in establishing a child's emo-
tional stability, character and self-image is universally recog-
nized. The erosion of this influence would have a profound effect
on the individual child and on society as a whole. Child psychol-
ogists and behavioral scientists generally agree that it is essen-
139. See generally id. at 502-03. Commentators have stated that the failure and decay of
the family would affect all of society. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 113, at 917.
140. See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983); In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d
426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309
(Westchester County Ct. 1979). Although the constitutional basis for the parent-child privi-
leges as to confidential communications is particularly strong, the Constitution also supports
the parent-child privileges as to adverse testimony.
141. Comment, supra note 77, at 1016. For a discussion of the autonomy strand of the
right of privacy, see id. at 1015-17.
142. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 113, at 917.
143. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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tial to the parent-child relationship that the lines of communica-
tion remain open and that the child be encouraged to "talk out"
his problems. It is therefore critical to a child's emotional devel-
opment that he know that he may explore his problems in an
atmosphere of trust and understanding without fear that his
confidences will later be revealed to others.'
The Supreme Court has established firmly that the family occu-
pies a position deserving of constitutional protection. The Court
specifically has recognized that the parent-child relationship is at
the core of American society.'45 The Court's decisions make clear
that the Constitution provides a firm cornerstone upon which the
parent-child privileges can be built.
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 501
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 gives the federal courts a statutory
guide to use when dealing with claims for the adoption of a new
privilege. 146 Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1975,
state courts and legislatures largely dictated American privilege
law. 14 7
The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 was less than
smooth. In March 1968 Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed an
advisory committee to formulate rules of evidence for the federal
courts. The advisory committee's report contained thirteen rules
that applied in different privileged situations. 48 Only two rules set
forth broad privileges: the priest-penitent confidential communica-
144. Id. at 432, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
145. See, e.g., supra note 133 and accompanying text.
146. FED. R. EVID. 501 reads as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rules of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
147. See Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 614 (1976).
148. See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 202-
34 (1984).
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tions privilege and the attorney-client confidential communications
privilege. The report reduced the scope of the marital privileges to
criminal matters in which the accused's rights needed protection.
Numerous attacks on the Proposed Rules came not only from the
House and Senate but from special interest groups who were not
protected by the privilege rules.14 9
Perhaps more important than the very narrow scope of the con-
fidential communications privileges contained in the Proposed
Rules was the fact that the Rules provided for no testimonial privi-
lege that was not already contained in the statute itself, or unless a
statute or the Constitution could be construed to allow a privilege.
In effect, this provision was an attempt by the Supreme Court to
limit privilege law and preclude its common law expansion. Al-
though the purposes behind this limitation-uniformity and judi-
cial economy-were worthy causes, Congress recognized the diffi-
culties present in the Proposed Rules on privilege and acted to
prevent them from being adopted. Professor Krattenmaker noted:
The intense public controversy over these privilege provisions
led Congress to take the unprecedented step of acting to prevent
the Rules from becoming effective until Congress had given
them plenary review. That action effectively transformed the
Advisory Committee's Proposed Rules into little more than a
preliminary congressional draft of a bill.150
Congress rejected the Proposed Rules' narrow approach to privi-
lege, and instead passed Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which al-
lows and provides for the creation of new privileges. Rule 501 was
not intended to reduce the scope of testimonial privileges as they
had been developed up to that point. In essence, rule 501 left the
door open for the judicial adoption of privileges such as the par-
ent-child privileges. The legislative history behind rule 501 sup-
ports this proposition. Immediately preceding the passage of the
bill that proposed the Federal Rules, Representative Hungate
stated:
149. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 331-46 (4th ed.
1982).
150. See Krattenmaker, supra note 147, at 638 (footnotes omitted).
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Rule 501 is not intended to freeze the law of privilege as it now
exists. The phrase "governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted. . . in light of reason and expe-
rience" is intended to provide the courts with the flexibility to
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.151
Although rule 501 allows the federal courts to adopt new privileges,
the courts remain hesitant. Some courts apparently do not inter-
pret rule 501 expansively and decline to examine it carefully. Only
two federal courts have thoroughly examined the adoption of par-
ent-child privileges under the rule.'52
C. The Wigmore Test
Dean Wigmore proposed four fundamental conditions for the ex-
istence of a privilege. 53 These four conditions are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed;
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties;
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered; and
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure of
the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation. 15
These conditions have been widely accepted as the basis for both
scholarly and judicial analyses of the application of a privilege in a
given factual context.'55 The Wigmore "test," however, only ap-
plies to confidential communications, and not to testimonial privi-
leges. This Article, therefore, analyzes only the proposed parent-
child confidential communications .privilege under the test. Upon
151. 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974).
152. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) (in a lengthy opinion, the court
adopted a parent-child privilege); In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 579 (D.
Conn. 1982).
153. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2285, at 527.
154. Id.
155. See Stanton, supra note 88, at 3.
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examination, the proposed parent-child confidential communica-
tions privilege satisfies each condition of the Wigmore test.
With regard to the first condition, all parent-child communica-
tions clearly originate in confidence; the parent-child relationship
naturally breeds that type of communication.1 56 Parents and chil-
dren typically participate in conduct which they presume will re-
main private.157
With regard to the second condition, confidentiality is obviously
essential to the parent-child relationship. Such relationships are
built on mutual love and trust. An atmosphere of confidentiality
coupled with the child's dependency upon the parent allows the
child to admit wrongdoings to the parent in search of guidance.
The parent-child privilege also satisfies the third condition. As
previously discussed,158 society is based on the family unit, and the
heart of the family unit is the parent-child relationship. Few would
argue that society should not sedulously foster the parent-child
relationship.
The parent-child privilege also satisfies Wigmore's final condi-
tion. The potential injury to the parent-child relationship clearly
would be greater than the benefit gained by the correct disposal of
the litigation. If a parent or his child were compelled by the state
to testify, each thus betraying the other, the trust that existed be-
tween the two would cease, possibly never to be regained.
D. Existing Privileges in American Law Support the Adoption of
the Parent-Child Privileges
The attorney-client, priest-penitent, husband-wife, and psycho-
therapist-patient privileges are firmly rooted in American law. The
professional privileges are based on common policy grounds. 59 The
benefits derived from protecting the confidentiality of communica-
tions made in the course of seeking the services of the privileged
professionals are generally agreed to far outweigh the inconve-
nience or obstacles that may arise during any legal fact finding
process. The two existing American privileges most similar to the
156. See Connery, The Right To Silence, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 180 (1956).
157. See supra notes 68-100 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
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parent-child privilege are the psychotherapist-patient and spousal
privileges. Both relationships are dependent on a free flow of
highly personal information. Both situations need privacy and con-
fidentiality to function properly. Society protects these relation-
ships from intrusion by the state because it recognizes they could
not exist if they were not shrouded in confidentiality- One com-
mentator, writing in support of a parent-child privilege, stated:
It is anomalous that the ... [parent-child] relationship... has
not been accorded the same protection from compelled disclo-
sure as has the professional relationship. It may be a recent phe-
nomenon that one pays for services that used to be provided and
promoted within the traditional family context, but it is illogical
to require ... [a parent or child to] turn to outside profession-
als in order for his private communications to be protected.'"0
Its similarities to the psychotherapist-patient relationship and its
stronger similarities to the marital relationship make the parent-
child relationship a perfect candidate for a privilege. Indeed, the
benefits to be derived from protecting the parent-child relationship
reasonably could be greater than those associated with the other
relationships. In adopting the marital privileges, state legislatures
surely did not intend to suggest that the parent-child relationship
is less deserving of protection by the law. The parent-child rela-
tionship is life-long. Unlike the other relationships, it is terminated
only upon the death of the parent or the child, and not merely by
the payment of a fee or by a judicial decree.
VI. SOCIAL POLICY ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PARENT-CHILD
PRIVILEGE
A number of social policy arguments can be advanced in support
of the parent-child privileges. These social policies arguably cannot
stand as the sole basis for adoption of the privileges."'1 When the
parent-child privilege is at issue, however, these policy arguments
do not stand alone; the aforementioned constitutional arguments
are a necessary companion.
160. Stanton, supra note 88, at 13.
161. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 77, at 1011.
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A. Family Harmony
The protection of peace and harmony within the family is a ma-
jor social policy rationale underlying the parent-child privileges.' 62
A wholesome family relationship is something society should con-
tinue to promote. Indeed, in expressing its concern about the state
of the family, one court said:
In a democracy or a polity like ours, the government of well-
ordered home is one of the surest bulwarks against the forces
that make for social disorder and civil decay. It [the family] is
the very cradle of civilization, with the future of the common-
wealth dependent, in a large measure, upon the efficacy and suc-
cess of its administration.'
Inherent in this passage is the fact that the failure and decay of
the family unit has a corresponding effect on society as a whole. 6 4
Positive family interaction has been credited with playing a signifi-
cant role in the development of positive values, attitudes, and be-
havior."6 5 Empirical evidence suggests strongly that families that
emphasize open communication and active decision making and
problem solving produce members of society who are considered
more productive.166
Although the arguments for preventing compelled adverse testi-
mony and the arguments for preventing compelled disclosure of
confidential communications vary slightly,167 they share the same
ultimate goal of upholding the position of the family. Even those
who oppose adoption of the parent-child privileges cannot argue
that this is not a noble goal. The parent-child privileges against
162. See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325 (D. Nev. 1983). This rationale also
underlies the spousal privileges. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980);
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1958).
163. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584, 118 S.E. 12, 15 (1923).
164. See Furlong, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Family Stability, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 105, 114 (1967).
165. See, e.g., R. CAVAN & T. FERDINAND, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
ch. 16 (3d ed. 1978).
166. Id.
167. Forced disclosure of adverse facts, acts, or observations would disrupt family peace
and harmony. Forced disclosure of confidential communications would foster disloyalty and
distrust and shut down communication channels. In both instances, the parent-child rela-
tionship would be destroyed. This Article makes a general argument in favor of the needed
privileges. Without them this destruction of the family will continue.
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compelled disclosure of confidential communications seek to pre-
serve the sense of trust that forms the basis of a parent-child rela-
tionship. The law cannot conclude that the absence of this trust
would not impact on the ability of individuals to function within
the social context of democracy.
Critics argue that some unacceptable behavior may already have
occurred when these privileges are sought to be invoked and,
therefore, that the adoption of the privileges would serve to shield
unlawful or wrongful acts. 16 8 Although some unacceptable or anti-
social behavior may indeed have occurred when the privileges are
asserted, to reach the truth at the cost of the parent-child relation-
ship would be to win the battle and lose the war. 6 The proposed
model statute addresses these concerns and provides exceptions to
deal with violent, unlawful, or wrongful acts within the family. 70
The time-honored goal of preserving family harmony and peace
is more important today than it ever has been. If a parent or child
is forced to testify against the other, whether the testimony con-
cerned adverse conduct or disclosure of a confidential communica-
tion, a socially essential relationship would be severely harmed, if
not destroyed.
B. Natural Repugnancy
In addition to disrupting family harmony and peace within the
parent-child relationship, compelled adverse testimony or com-
pelled disclosure of a confidential communication would be repug-
nant to social sensibilities.' 7' Indeed, one court has commented
that "forcing a mother and father to reveal their child's alleged
misdeeds . .. is shocking to our sense of decency, fairness, and
propriety.'1' 2
Although some critics have dismissed the repugnancy argument
as sentimental, 173 the facts and feelings underlying the argument
are very real. The actions of totalitarian governments should serve
168. -See, e.g., Note,- Questioning the Recognition of a Parent-Child Testimonial Privi-
lege, 45 ALB. L. REV. 142, 154 (1980).
169. See Coburn, supra note 46, at 632.
170. See app. infra.
171. Cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2228, at 217 (discussing marital privileges).
172. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, -, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978).
173. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 86, at 202.
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as adequate reminders of the horrors which thrive when certain
relationships are deemed subordinate to the state. 174 A young So-
viet youth, for example, became a national hero because he placed
the interests of the Communist Party above family loyality:
Few Westerners would recognize the name, but Pavlik
Morozov is a household word to Russians, who know his story
from their schooldays as well as Americans know the legend of
George Washington's felling of the cherry tree.
The difference is that in the morality tale of Pavlik Morozov,
the son didn't run to his father to forthrightly admit his own
misdeeds. Thirteen-year-old Pavlik ran instead to Communist
Party officials in 1932 to denounce his father as an enemy of the
state, an act that in Stalin's time was tantamount to signing his
father's death warrant.
17 5
This story provides a classic example of the way a government
with unbridled power influences and intrudes upon family loyalty
and privacy.
Examples of undue intrusion by the government appear in the
history of our country. One of the most frightening was an early
Louisiana law that established a government informant system. 176
In speaking out against the law, Edward Livingston, an eighteenth
century jurist, voiced his repugnance by stating:
The ferocious legislation . . . demands . .. the sacrifice of all
feelings of nature, of all the sentiments of humanity; breaks the
ties of gratitude and honor; makes obedience to the law consist
in a dereliction of every principle that gives dignity to man
.... Dreadful as this picture is, the original is found in the law
of accessories after the fact. If the father commits treason, the
son must abandon, (the country) or deliver him up to the execu-
tioner (if he later learns about it) .... [M]en are required to
be faithless, treacherous, unnatural, and cruel, in order to prove
that they are good citizens .... 17
174. See supra text accompanying note 1.
175. See Gillette, The Informer: To A Russian, He's A Hero, L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1982,
at 1, col. 1.
176. Franklin, The Encyclop~diste Origin and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment, 15 LAW
GUILD REv. 41, 46 (1955).
177. Id. (quoting E. LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 14
(1833)).
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The natural repugnancy argument has existed for centuries and
is accepted commonly by society and the courts as a supporting
rationale for the spousal privileges. 17 8 Some believe that this same
argument should apply to the parent-child relationship, because it
is a relationship that is in need of, and possibly more deserving of,
protection and nurturing. 17 9
C. Witnesses' Dilemma
The last social policy has been referred to as the "no-win argu-
ment."180 This situation places the witness in the ultimate tight
spot. Parents and children presently may be called to testify
against one another in many state and federal jurisdictions. Such
persons face three unpleasant courses of conduct. First, the parent
or child witness can comply and testify, thus condemning his or
her parent or child. Second, the witness can refuse to testify, thus
risking contempt of court. Finally, the witness can deliberately lie
under oath to protect the relative, thus breaking the law him or
herself.
The first course of conduct places the family harmony in serious
jeopardy. If the parent or child witness chooses voluntarily to tes-
tify then, of course, there is arguably no family harmony to pro-
tect. 8 ' The second course of conduct forces the witness into com-
mitting contempt. 182 In one case, for example, a father and mother
were incarcerated for refusing to testify against their son.183 The
178. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2228, at 217.
179. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 77, at 1009-10.
180. Kraft, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Who's Minding the Kids?, 18 FAM.
L.Q. 505, 515 (1985).
181. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (marital privilege). To accomo-
date the voluntary witness situation, the Court held that the marital adverse testimonial
privilege is a witness-held privilege. Id. at 53.
182. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978) (discussing the risk of
prosecution for contempt if the parent-child witness refused to comply with a disclosure
request); see also State v. Delong, 456 A.2d 877 (Me. 1983); Smith, Silence on Dad Lands
Son in Jail, Ariz. Republic, June 17, 1987, at B4, col. 1.
183. See, Port v. Heard, 594 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Tex. 1984), afl'd, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1985). This decision involved the celebrated case in which 17-year-old David Port was
charged with murder. Mr. and Mrs. Port refused to testify before the grand jury, and subse-
quently were jailed for contempt. Mr. Port was released after two months in jail, but Mrs.
Port was not released for four-and-one-half months. Both were in jail while their son was
free on $20,000 bond. Both were freed before the trial began, but neither was subpoenaed to
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social values advanced or the lessons learned by the imprisonment
of the parents in such cases are difficult to discern. If nothing else,
the cases point to the value in and need for adoption of the parent-
child privileges.
The final option, lying under oath, forces the witness into a posi-
tion where he or she could be charged with perjury, a felony in
many jurisdictions. The ancient Romans anticipated this very pre-
dicament when they fashioned their family privilege, which ren-
dered family members incompetent to testify against one another
due to the possibility for perjury."8 4
Exactly how many witnesses have perjured themselves to protect
their parents or children is difficult to determine. The dilemma,
however, is very real, as documented by the facts in United States
v. Ismail.l' 5 In that case, the defendant's son was called before a
grand jury to testify against him. The son had such anxiety and
guilt feelings about testifying against his father that he lied and
stated that he knew nothing about his father's business.186 After
admitting his perjury to the United States Attorney and knowing
that he would be compelled to testify at trial, he contemplated sui-
cide.187 After he did testify, the witness was ostracized from his
community. 8
The state's interest in ascertaining the truth is certainly not at
all advanced by creating a situation which invites perjury. Because
the interests of adjudication are not furthered when the witness is
forced to commit perjury, some commentators argue that privileges
actually aid the ascertainment of truth by eliminating those situa-
tions in which perjured testimony is more likely.8 " The perjury dy-
namic also damages the integrity of the court system; a defendant
who has already committed an unlawful or wrongful act might be
encouraged to try to avoid the penalty with perjury-another un-
testify. After a three-week trial, jury deliberations lasted two-and-one-half hours. David was
found guilty and was sentenced to 75 years in prison. In this case, it can hardly be said that
his parents' testimony was needed.
184. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 10, at 487-89.
185. 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985).
186. Id. at 1256.
187. Id. at 1256 n.3.
188. Id.
189. See, e.g., Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 109-10 (1956).
[Vol. 28:583
PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGES STATUTE
lawful act. Such a person could reasonably begin to think that
"two wrongs do make a right."'' 0
The adoption of the parent-child privileges could eliminate the
witness's dilemma. Parents or children should not be incarcerated
for what could be interpreted as the crime of family loyalty. Ac-
cording to one court, we should avoid placing the government in
the inconsistent position of having to actively punish unselfishness
and loyalty, values which are instilled by the family, the church,
and even the state itself.19 1
VII. RECENT DECISIONS IN PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE CASES
No parent-child privilege existed at common law. To date, two
states have recognized such a privilege by statute.9 2 New York was
the first state to adopt judicially the concept of a parent-child
privilege. 3 In People v. Fitzgerald,9  the court found the privi-
lege was based on the right of privacy "flowing directly" from the
United States and New York constitutions. 9 A year earlier, the
same court held in In re A & M that a parent-child confidential
communications privilege fell within the constitutional protection
of privacy.197 The court did not, however, extend the same protec-
tion to a parent-child adverse testimonial privilege, stating that it
could only be created by the legislature. 98
Two federal district courts also have upheld assertions of parent-
child privilege. In In re Agosto, 99 the court upheld both adverse
testimonial and confidential communications parent-child privi-
leges. The court based its decision on the first amendment's free
190. See, e.g., Coburn, supra note 46, at 629; see also Kraft, supra note 180, at 515. Dr.
Kraft stated that the defendant "stands to suffer a 'distorted perspective' of a justice system
which is rigid to the point of fostering falsified testimony or compromising natural loyal-
ties." Id.
191. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983).
192. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. 595.02(i) (West Supp.
1987).
193. See People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 724-25, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 317 (Westches-
ter County Ct. 1979).
194. 101 Misc. 2d 712, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979).
195. Id. at 716-17, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
196. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Westchester County Ct. 1978).
197. Id. at 430-31, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79.
198. See id. at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
199. 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983).
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exercise clause, a right to privacy, and the social policy of promot-
ing family harmony. 00 The decision in Agosto has met with a tre-
mendous amount of criticism. The most common attack is based
on the fact that the child who refused to testify was thirty-two
years old.2 0'
Several reasons support the decision in Agosto recognizing the
parent-child privileges, but In re Greenberg°s acknowledges the
existence of a parent-child privilege for two very specific points:
the free exercise clause and ancient Jewish law that forbids parents
and children from testifying against one another. 03 This decision
has met with criticism not only from lawyers or judges, but from
Jewish law scholars and rabbis who claim that the court misrepre-
sented the ancient rule.20 4
Although a number of federal courts have refused to recognize a
205 "haparent-child privilege, no court has abandoned the idea entirely
nor has any court clearly stated that the privilege should never ap-
ply. As the following cases demonstrate, the federal courts may
still be receptive to the concept when the fact situation is
appropriate.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for
example, is often credited mistakenly with refusing to recognize a
parent-child privilege in In re Matthews 0° What the court refused
to uphold, however, was not a parent-child privilege but an in-law
privilege. 0° The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed the issue of a parent-child adverse testimonial
privilege in United States v. Jones.s08 In Jones a twenty-nine-
year-old son refused to testify before a grand jury about his father.
The court declined the opportunity to recognize the privilege, but
200. Id. at 1310-27.
201. Id.
202. 11 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 579 (D. Conn. 1982).
203. Id. at 587.
204. Discussion with Rabbi Goldstein of the Temple Beth Israel in Macon, Georgia.
205. See, e.g., In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 683
F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Starr, 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981); United
States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1067 (1981);
United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
206. 714 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1983).
207. Id. at 224.
208. 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982).
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left open the possibility that a privilege might exist under a differ-
ent fact pattern, particularly if the child were unemancipated' 0 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on
a similar rationale in United States v. Ismail.210 The court denied
an emancipated child's claim to a parent-child privilege, but left
open the possibility for a parent-child privilege between a parent
and an unemancipated child.211
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the application of a parent-child privilege in United States
v. Davies,212 where the issue arose in the context of a police investi-
gation. The court stated that if a privilege did exist, it would apply
only in judicial proceedings.1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue briefly in United States v. Penn.14 Although the
court declined to apply a privilege, it did not address the merits in
any detail. The facts of the case involved no disclosure of a confi-
dential communication or adverse testimony on the part of the
child witness; the privilege was asserted during a suppression hear-
ing to block the introduction of physical evidence.215
VIII. CONCLUSION
The official comment explains the proposed model parent-child
privileges statute in detail. The model statute is similar in basic
concept to the existing spousal privileges in that it addresses both
adverse testimony and confidential communications. The excep-
tions to the privileges are stated clearly, and a close reading of the
statute demonstrates its narrow scope. It should be noted that the
model statute is unique in many respects, but most particularly in
that it carries a penalty section for violations.
Recent news reports telling the emotional stories of children
turning in their parents to the authorities for drug use demon-
209. Id. at 819.
210. 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985).
211. Id. at 1258; see also In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (court denied the
existence of a parent-child privilege in one sentence; "child" was an emancipated adult).
212. 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 553 (1985).
213. Id. at 900.
214. 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980).
215. Id. at 885.
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strate in one particularly vivid context the need for the parent-
child privileges. These children have been portrayed to others as
young heroes, and have been applauded for their brave actions.
But what about the hero's brother or sister? The proposed model
statute would allow the hero to testify under the adverse testimo-
nial privilege, but would protect the hesitant or fearful brother or
sister.
Although given the opportunity, many courts have neither sanc-
tioned nor rejected the adverse testimonial and confidential com-
munications privileges within the parent-child context. In fact,
many courts have taken the position that both privileges may be
viable, albeit under circumstances different than those presented
to them.
The courts' hesitance to recognize either privilege appears to be
based on four common themes. First, in several cases the "child"
has been an emancipated adult. Second, the federal courts seem to
be confused as to the proper application of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 501. Third, the state courts believe that it is the task of the
legislature to develop the privileges. Fourth, courts and legislatures
presently have no comprehensive guidelines to follow when consid-
ering the concepts of one or both privileges. The adoption of the
model parent-child privilege statute would clarify the issues and
provide the necessary guidance to the courts and legislatures.
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101. Definitions
As used in this statute, the following words and phrases have the
meanings indicated:
(a) "Adverse" means incriminating or which has a sub-
stantial likelihood of incriminating.
(b) "Child" means a person who has not reached the
age of majority.
(c) "Confidential communication" means a message in-
tended to convey a meaning, made between a parent
and the parent's child with the reasonable expecta-
tion its content not be made known by anyone ex-
cept family members. The message may be made by
any means including oral, written or sign language
or assertive conduct.
(d) "Family member" means a parent or the parent's
child.
(e) "Parent" means a birth, adoptive or step-parent or
legal guardian. It also means any person the court
recognizes to have acquired a right to act as a par-
ent, such as a foster parent or relative having long
term custody of a child.
(f) "Party to a confidential communication" means a
parent or the parent's child who makes a confiden-
tial communication or who was intended to receive
that confidential communication.
(g) "Proceeding" means any matter pending before any
judicial or administrative body where testimony
under oath is required.
102. Adverse Testimonial Privilege
(a)(1) Privilege Created. There is an adverse testimonial
privilege.
(2) The privilege is delineated by this Section.
(b)(1) Scope. The adverse testimonial privilege exists
when either a parent or the parent's child is:
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(i) a defendant in a criminal proceeding or the
subject of a juvenile delinquency proceeding,
and the other is called to give testimony; or
(ii) called to give testimony concerning the other
in a grand jury proceeding.
(2) (i) Neither a parent nor the parent's child who
validly asserts the adverse testimonial privi-
lege in a criminal proceeding may be com-
pelled to provide an answer to a question if it
would be adverse to the other.
(ii) However, a parent or a child who is a witness
may not assert the privilege in response to a
question about a matter that occurred at a
time when the relationship of parent and child
did not exist between the defendant and the
witness.
(c) Witness Held. The adverse testimonial privilege is
held by the parent or the child who is a witness.
(d) Exceptions. There is no adverse testimonial privi-
lege:
(1) When a defendant is charged with a crime
against the person or property of the witness or a
family member; or
(2) When the witness is involved with the defendant
in any criminal activity.
103. Confidential Communications Privilege.
(a) (1) Privilege Created. There is a confidential communi-
cations privilege.
(2) It is delineated by this Section.
(b)(1) Scope. The confidential communications privilege
may be asserted by a parent or the parent's child
when either of them is:
(i) a party to any proceeding and the other is
called to give testimony; or
(ii) called to give testimony concerning the other
in a grand jury proceeding.
(2) (i) Neither a parent nor the parent's child may
be compelled to answer a question concerning
[Vol. 28:583
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confidential communications if the confiden-
tial communications privilege is validly as-
serted in a proceeding.
(ii) However, the witness may be compelled to an-
swer a question if at the time the confidential
communication was made the parent-child re-
lationship did not exist.
(c) Jointly Held.
(1) The confidential communications privilege is
jointly held by each party to a confidential
communication.
(2) Any party to a confidential communication
may raise the privilege and thereby prevent
the communication from being disclosed by
the other party in any proceeding.
(d) Exceptions. There is no confidential communica-
tions privilege in any proceeding in which:
(1) A parent and the parent's child are opposing
parties;
(2) A child's parents are opposing parties;
(3) A parent or the parent's child is a party, if the
parent and the child were jointly involved in
the activity giving rise to the proceeding;
(4) A parent or the parent's child is a party, in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding if the ba-
sis of the proceeding is alleged acts committed
against the person or property of a family
member;
(5) An action is brought to commit a parent or
child because of alleged mental incompetence
or a mental disorder or to establish a parent
or child's mental competence;
(6) An action is brought to place the person or
property of a parent or the parent's child in
the custody or control of another because of
alleged mental or physical incompetence;
(7) The neglect, dependency, deprivation, aban-
donment or nonsupport of a child's parent or
a parent's child is at issue;
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(8) The mental, physical or sexual abuse of a par-
ent or the parent's child is at issue; or
(9) Termination of parental rights is at issue.
104. Penalties.
(a) Penalty for Nondisclosure of Testimony.
(1) If no adverse testimonial privilege or confiden-
tial communications privilege exists, the court
shall require the person to testify provided no
other rule or law prevents the compelled dis-
closure of that testimony.
(2) Refusal to testify is punishable by the court as
contempt.
(3) If the witness refuses to disclose the com-
pelled testimony in violation of paragraph (2),
the court, in determining the appropriate pen-
alty, shall consider among other factors:
(i) The age, and the mental and physical condi-
tion of the witness; and
(ii) The present and future welfare and protection
of the witness.
(b) Penalty for Unauthorized Disclosure of a Privi-
leged Confidential Communication.
(1) If a confidential communication is held to be
privileged, the witness shall not disclose the
confidential communication in a proceeding.
(2) A parent or child who discloses in a proceed-
ing a privileged confidential communication
which has been validly raised may be punisha-
ble by the court for contempt.
(3) If a witness discloses the confidential commu-
nication in violation of paragraph (1), the
court, in determining the appropriate penalty,
shall consider among other factors:
(i) The age, and the mental and physical condi-
tion of the witness; and
(ii) The present and future welfare and protection
of the witness.
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COMMENT
Introduction
During the 1983-84 Association Year, the Defense Function
Committee was requested to consider the issue of the need for a
parent-child privilege. The request was prompted by a case that
gained national attention because a child was held in contempt by
a court for failure to testify against her parents. It was requested
that the Defense Function Committee consult with the Prosecution
Function Committee in assessing this situation.
The Defense Function Committee has concluded that there is a
need for a privilege. The most expeditious way to create the privi-
lege is through legislation. To facilitate this, the model statute has
been drafted.
The Prosecution Function Committee has been consulted during
the course of drafting the model statute. Its advice has regularly
been solicited.
The statute is narrow in scope. It protects only the relationship
between parents and their minor children. It does not extend to all
members of the family.
This relationship is protected in two respects. First, an adverse
testimonial privilege is created to prohibit parents and minor chil-
dren from being forced to give incriminating testimony against
each other. It is not an "automatic" privilege. It must be affirma-
tively raised. Neither is it a "blanket" privilege precluding any tes-
timony. It relates solely to testimony that has the potential of be-
ing incriminating. However, it does not apply if the parent and
child have been "partners in crime," or if one has used the other as
an unwitting accomplice.
Second, a confidential communications privilege is created. It
protects parents and their minor children from being forced to di-
vulge in any proceeding (civil or criminal) communications be-
tween them that were intended to be confidential. This privilege is
jointly held. Once the privilege is asserted, the parents and the
children between whom the confidential communication took place
may not divulge the contents of it in any proceeding. Various ex-
ceptions are recognized in the statute to cover situations where the
parents and children are opposing parties or have competing
interests.
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Definitions (Section 101)
(a) Adverse: One of the principle purposes of the par-
ent-child privileges statute is to prevent parents and
their children from being forced to give incriminat-
ing testimony against each other. The word "ad-
verse" is used to describe questions, the answer to
which would be "incriminating or have a substantial
likelihood of being incriminating." The defined
word "adverse" is used principally in subsection
102(b)(1).
It may not be possible to determine that the answer to the ques-
tion would absolutely be incriminating. Therefore, a lesser stan-
dard of "substantial likelihood" is provided that permits testimony
to be precluded on that basis.
(b) Child: The age by which a person is determined to
be a "child" is determined by each State's law on
the age of majority. This definition does not provide
for a mentally defective person to be considered a
"child" once that person has reached the age of ma-
jority. Therefore, in rare instances when a person's
chronological age has reached the age of majority
but the mental age is in question, it shall be left to
the court to determine if that person falls within the
definition of "child" as used in this statute.
(c) Confidential Communication: The definition of
"confidential communication" is intended to be
broad. It gives recognition to the fact that children
often communicate with their parents by means
other than the spoken word. Young children are es-
pecially prone to communicate confidentially with
their parents by gestures, expressions of emotion,
unique mannerisms or other behavior, the meaning
of which is clearly understood by the parent and the
child.
The presence of a family member when a confidential communi-
cation is made between parent and child will not void the privilege.
This is a recognition of the closeness of persons living in family
units. It may not be possible for a parent and a child to communi-
cate with each other without some other family member being
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privy to the communication. In addition, the closeness of the fam-
ily unit may negate the parents' and children's perception of a
need to communicate secretly among themselves. The statute does
not seek to punish parents and children who have this kind of
open relationship within their family. However, any family mem-
ber who is present when the confidential communication is made
cannot raise the privilege to preclude being required to testify.
(d) Family Member: The definition of "family member"
is limited to the nuclear family (i.e. parents and
their children). The term is used in the definition of
"confidential communication" to restrict this term
to the select communications that are made within
the family unit with the expectation that it will be
known only to parents and siblings. It is also used in
subsections 102(c)(1) and 103(d)(4). These subsec-
tions create exceptions to the raising of the adverse
testimonial privilege when the parent and the child
have competing interests.
(e) Parent: The definition of "parent" includes those
persons who most commonly have a parental rela-
tionship with a child. It is possible that a child
could at different times have all categories of these
parents (i.e. birth parents, adoptive parents, step-
parents and legal guardians). However, the confi-
dential communication privilege and the adverse
testimonial privilege may only be asserted with re-
gard to communications that occurred at the time
the parent and child relationship existed. Therefore,
a communication made between a child and some-
one who has not yet become the child's step-parent
(or who has ceased to be a step-parent due to di-
vorce) would not be subject to either of the privi-
leges. (See subsections 102(b)(2)(ii) and
103(b)(2)(iii)).
Whether or not it includes foster parents (and thereby extends
the privileges to foster parents and children in their care) is left to
the discretion of the court. The court also would have the discre-
tion to recognize the existence of a parent-child relationship be-
tween a child and other persons. Typical examples would be grand-
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parents or an aunt and an uncle who are raising the child. It could
also include situations where a parent-child relationship exists but
there is no biological or legal relationship between the two parties.
(f) Party to a Confidential Communication: The defi-
nition limits this phrase to a parent and the par-
ent's child. In addition, the parent or the child must
have been intended to be the recipient of the com-
munication. Therefore, if a child confides something
to one parent with the intent that it not be known
by the other parent, the privilege cannot be raised
to foreclose testimony by the parent who was not
the intended recipient of the communication.
The phrase does not include family members. The present of a
family member during the making of a confidential communication
does not make the family member a "party to the confidential
communication" as defined by the statute. In this situation, the
privilege does not extend to the family member.
(g) Proceeding: This definition is consistent with Rule
1101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It guarantees
that the privileges apply at all stages of actions,
cases and proceedings, including grand jury pro-
ceedings.
Adverse Testimonial Privilege (Section 102)
Section 102 addresses the first of the two privileges created by
this statute. It is known as the "adverse testimonial privilege."
(a) This subsection contains the operative language
that creates the privilege. The privilege is described
in subsection (b).
(b) The parent-child adverse testimonial privilege is
similar to the testimonial marital privilege articu-
lated in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980). As stated in subsection (b), the privilege
may be asserted only by the parent or child who is a
witness. It may only be asserted in criminal pro-
ceedings, juvenile delinquency proceedings, or grand
jury proceedings.
Paragraph (2) contains the critical language that vests a parent
or a child with the right to raise the privilege only if the question
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relates to a matter that occurred at the time when the parent-child
relationship existed. (See discussion under definition of "parent.")
(c) This subsection states the exceptions to the adverse
testimonial privilege. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2)
recognize necessary exceptions to the adverse testi-
monial privilege when full disclosure in the fact
finding process outweighs the policy of promoting
family harmony.
Paragraph (c)(1) is necessary to permit family members to tes-
tify concerning acts of violence on the part of a parent or a child
against other family members. This exception is made because the
safety of family members and the security of their property is re-
garded as being paramount to protecting the relationship between
a parent and a child. In addition, the existence of violence and
property destruction within the family is strong evidence that one
of the primary reasons for the privilege (i.e. protecting the unity of
the family) has ceased to exist.
Paragraph (c)(2) is necessary to protect society from criminal ac-
tivity on the part of a parent and the parent's child. This excep-
tion is created in recognition that the privilege should not be per-
mitted to be used as a shield to protect parents and children who
jointly commit crimes.
Confidential Communications Privilege (Section 103)
Section 103 addresses the second of the two privileges created by
this statute. It is known as the "confidential communications
privilege."
(a) This subsection contains the operative language
that creates the privilege. The privilege is described
in subsection (b).
(b) There are a number of differences between the ad-
verse testimonial privilege outlined in Section 102
and the confidential communications privilege.
These differences are created through the divergent
provisions in subsections 102(b) and 103(b).
Subsection 103(b) provides that the confidential communications
privilege applies in "any proceeding" (see subsection 103(b)(1)(i)).
Unlike the adverse testimonial privilege, it is not limited to pro-
ceedings that are criminal in nature. This distinction between the
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privileges arises because the adverse testimonial privilege only
seeks to protect parents and their children from being compelled
to make statements that may be directly "incriminating" to each
other, hence surfacing in the context of a criminal proceeding. It
acts as a bar to the State abusing its authority to force parents and
children to testify against each other.
The confidential communications privilege has a broader pur-
pose. It is not intended merely to prevent abuse by the
prosecutorial authorities. It seeks to grant sanctity and protection
to all communications between parents and their children that
those parties intend to be confidential. For this reason, the privi-
lege acts as a shield to preclude these communications from being
disclosed in any forum, whether it be criminal or civil.
Another distinction is created by paragraph 103(b)(1). It pro-
vides that the confidential communication privilege may be as-
serted by either a parent or the parent's child. Unlike the adverse
testimonial privilege, it need not be asserted by the witness. The
rationale of allowing either party to the communication to assert
the privilege is based on the fact that the communication is a con-
fidence between them. Since both of them have an interest in it,
both of them should be able to invoke the privilege. This concept
is amplified by subsection (c).
Subsection (b)(2) explains the result of the confidential commu-
nications privilege being asserted. When it is validly asserted in a
proceeding (and no exception in subsection (d) applies) the witness
may not be compelled to disclose, nor voluntarily disclose, the con-
fidential communication.
(c) This subsection amplifies this concept by stating
that the privilege is jointly held. Under its provi-
sions, either the parent or the child can raise it to
preclude the other from disclosing, through testi-
mony, the nature of the communication.
The phrase "party to a confidential communication" is defined
by the statute. The implications of its meaning should be noted
when used in paragraph (c)(2). As discussed in the comment to
this defined phrase, the presence of a family member when a confi-
dential communication is made between a parent and the parent's
child will not void the privilege. However, as is true with the ad-
verse testimonial privilege, the family member is not covered by
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the privilege. This is in keeping with the fact that the statute does
not create a family or sibling privilege.
(d) This subsection outlines nine exceptions to the con-
fidential communications privilege. Each situation
covers an instance where the parent and the child
have competing interests, they are jointly involved
in some criminal activity, or it would not promote
the purpose of family harmony for the privilege to
be exercised.
Paragraph (d)(1) applies to situations in which the parent and
child are opposing parties. Since this suggests that the parent and
child voluntarily placed themselves in this adversarial position, the
policies behind the statute of preserving and fostering family har-
mony fail. In addition, it would be unfair to permit one of the par-
ties to use the privilege to silence the other's testimony about a
confidential communication that could contain exculpatory
evidence.
Paragraph (d)(2) serves to prevent collusions between a child
and one of the parents against the other parent. It is intended to
cover those situations where the interests of the child could be af-
fected. In addition, it covers situations in which one parent may
unduly influence a child and seek to use the child to the detriment
of the other parent.
Paragraph (d)(3) applies to civil and criminal proceedings. The
determination of whether the parent and child were jointly in-
volved in the activity which gave rise to the proceeding is left to
the court. In situations where a parent and a child are together
involved in illegal activity or wrongful conduct the fact finding
process outweighs the policy considerations of preserving and pro-
moting family harmony. This is particularly true when either the
parent or the child is using the other as an unwitting accomplice.
Paragraph (d)(4) is necessary to prevent the possibility of the
privilege being used as a shield when innocent family members'
person or property has been victimized by a parent or child.
Paragraphs (d)(5) and (6) apply in situations where mental com-
petency is at issue. In order for the court to protect the rights of
the person who is the subject of the proceeding, it is necessary that
full disclosure of communications between parents and their chil-
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dren be engendered. The need for truth in the fact finding process
is the overriding consideration in such matters.
Paragraphs (d)(7), (8), and (9) state nine specific situations in
which no privilege exists under the statute. These are situations
into which the court must often step to protect not only the indi-
vidual's rights but the individual himself from harm from a parent
or child. It should be noted that paragraph (8) is intended to cover
not only mental, physical, and sexual abuse inflicted by parents on
children, but also inflicted by children on a parent (e.g. elderly,
disabled, etc.). The exceptions are created by paragraphs (7), (8),
and (9), because there should be no obstacles in the path of the
fact finding process.
Penalties (Section 104)
Section 104 states the penalties for noncompliance with the pro-
visions of the statute.
(a) Paragraph (a)(1) creates a penalty for failure to pro-
vide testimony when an adverse testimonial privi-
lege or confidential communications privilege does
not exist, or when "no other rule of law" would pre-
vent compelled disclosure of the witness's testi-
mony. Paragraph (a)(2) states that a court's inher-
ent contempt powers should be used to punish
failures to testify. Paragraph (a)(3) sets out factors
the court should consider in fashioning the appro-
priate penalty. Since a child could be the one
charged with contempt, the court should take the
factors in subparagraphs (3)(i) and (ii) into consid-
eration when fashioning a penalty.
(a) This subsection applies only to the confidential
communications privilege. It gives an incentive for
these communications to be held in confidence by
providing penalties when they are disclosed in testi-
mony in a way that violates the statute. Paragraph
(2) states that the court should use its inherent con-
tempt powers to punish unauthorized disclosures.
Subparagraphs (3)(i) and (ii) set out factors the
court should consider when deciding the penalty for
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unauthorized disclosure of a privileged confidential
communication.
